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Global Insider: Iran-Qatar Relations

Posted By Kari Lipschutz 28 Jul 2010 As the final installment of a three-part series on Iran's relations with the Gulf states, Global Insider explores Iran-Qatar relations. In an e-mail interview, Mehran Kamrava, interim dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in Qatar and director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, discusses the state of Iran-Qatar relations. You can read Kamrava's interview on Iran-UAE relations here , and on Iran-Bahrain relations here.

WPR: What is the current state of Iran-Qatar diplomatic relations?

Mehran Kamrava: Unlike the UAE or Bahrain, Qatar has maintained very cordial and close diplomatic relations with Iran over the last few years. This is consistent with the overall pattern and tenor of Qatari foreign policy, which frequently features diplomatic hyper-activism, hedging, and a keen willingness to maintain open lines of communication between parties that are at odds with one another. This has manifested itself in a fair amount of "summit diplomacy" between the two countries, featuring high-level visits to each other's capitals and grand statements about the strength of "brotherly relations" between the two. Whether there is much depth and substance to these high-level visits, however, is open to question. Qatar is home to one of the largest U.S. airbases anywhere in the world, and, similar to the UAE and Bahrain, remains firmly under the protective umbrella of the U.S. military.

WPR: What is the current state of Iran-Qatar trade relations?

Kamrava: Similar to Iran's trade relations with Bahrain, Iran-Qatar trade remains negligible. Both countries have significant deposits of LNG, and the volume of trade between them is extremely small. Significantly, Qatar has been somewhat cool to Iran's proposal to create an OPEC-style forum of gas-exporting countries featuring Qatar, Iran, and Russia.

WPR: How has the standoff between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran's nuclear program impacted relations in both spheres?

Kamrava: The standoff between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran's nuclear program has not had any impact on Iran-Qatari relations. In fact, the United States appears to have had more success in selling the idea of an imminent Iranian threat to the rest of the Persian Gulf to the other GCC members save for Qatar (and Oman). This is consistent with Qatar's policy of hedging, which has sought to strike a proactive balance between antagonistic parties. Given this posture, Qatar, similar to Turkey and Brazil, has effectively positioned itself as a viable potential mediator between the U.S. and Iran should the two seek some form of conciliation in the future.

Turkey and the European Union

Posted By Judah Grunstein 28 Jul 2010 British Prime Minister David Cameron's comments in support of Turkey's EU membership bid offer a good opportunity to underline an important point: The question of whether or not Turkey belongs in the EU was already decided when the union offered Turkey membership.

Clearly, member states enjoy a wide range of political methods for dragging out or blocking the subsequent negotiation chapters. Slovenia, for instance, has used its veto power to block Croatia's membership negotiations over a border dispute that the two have since agreed to resolve by arbitration. It's also worth mentioning that Turkey has played a significant role in hobbling its own accession process, both by its Cyprus policy and its half-hearted approach to democratic and judicial reforms.

But the fundamental question of Turkey's "Europeanness" is no longer up for debate. And the cost for the EU in readjudicating that question will not only be measured by what it loses in terms of Turkey's potential strategic contributions to the union, but also by the hit the EU will take in terms of its credibility.

Israel Copter Crash in Romania

Posted By Judah Grunstein 28 Jul 2010 It hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet, but the Israeli helicopter that crashed in Romania is actually a major story. The copter had flown non-stop to Romania, with an in-flight refueling over Greece, as part of a "joint" air exercise designed to sharpen the IAF's long-range search-and-rescue capabilities in unfamiliar terrain. In the past, the IAF has conducted similar drills , as well as long-range mock bombing runs, in Greek airspace.

The implications of this latest setback for Israel's military on a theoretical airstrike against Iran are significant. If this was a psychological operation targeting Tehran, it backfired. If it was an operational training exercise, it revealed a level of unpreparedness that puts such an operation in doubt.

WikiLeaks 'Reveals' the Health of U.S. Democratic Institutions

Posted By Judah Grunstein 28 Jul 2010 I haven't had the time to read anything other than second-hand commentary on the WikiLeaks document dump, but as "revelations" go, this one seems to be weak tea. The direct effect on the Afghanistan War will most likely be felt in some of the relationships the U.S. must manage (Pakistan and India, for instance). There's also the risk that some of the granular information they contain, which extend to some NATO coalition partners, could accelerate the crumbling of support in Europe.

Beyond that, as Joshua Foust noted , there is the human cost faced by Afghan informants and other strategic assets whose identities have been compromised, and the systemic risk of the intelligence community viewing information-sharing with an even warier eye.

More than anything, though, the documents serve as yet another reminder that war requires secrecy, which by definition means hiding the truth. Sometimes that truth is hidden by government classification, while at others it is simply obscured by an overwhelming mass of data points and information overload.

For obvious reasons, such secrecy over the long term is incompatible with democracy. That is why democracies face a double disadvantage when engaging in war. Not only do they have to maintain popular support for the duration of the war effort, they also put at risk -- and at times actively undermine -- their own foundations by engaging in that war effort.

The danger, however, arises when secrecy crosses over the line into deception. And by this measure, the WikiLeaks documents, if anything, reassure. They "reveal" not only what most open source news outlets have thoroughly covered, but also what the U.S. government and military has largely admitted. If the documents themselves were protected by the shroud of classification (in part because of the cost of vetting such a mass of material for declassification), the picture they paint has already emerged from other sources -- both private and public, on and off the record.

If most Americans are not sufficiently aware of that, it is in part due to the information overload they are faced with, and in part due to their own choices of news consumption. Both causes reflect broader imperfections in our political system whose impact is not limited to the Afghanistan War.

Either way, however, the WikiLeaks documents suggest that, for now, at least, America has withstood the toxic effect of secrecy and war on its democratic institutions. And for that reason alone, the benefits of their release seem to be overshadowed by the costs.

Global Insider: India-Sri Lanka Relations

Posted By Kari Lipschutz 27 Jul 2010 India's chief of naval staff called for increased bilateral cooperation with Sri Lanka during a visit to the country late last month. In an e-mail interview, Eurasia Group's Asia analyst, Maria Kuusisto, discusses evolving relations between India and Sri Lanka.

WPR: What is the historical context of India-Sri Lanka relations?

Maria Kuusisto: India-Sri Lanka relations have been marked by both tension and cooperation. The relationship has been historically driven by the shared Tamil ethnic community: India has a Tamil community of 60 million and Sri Lanka has a Tamil community of three million. When the Tamil ethnic insurgency in Sri Lanka arose in the 1980s, it spread to southern India. Anti-Tamil violence in Colombo in 1983 thus prompted New Delhi to mediate a peace agreement and send a peacekeeping mission to enforce it. The accord gradually broke down, but during that time, the Indian peacekeeping force became part of the conflict, triggering calls for India to disengage. The Indian intervention -- which culminated in the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by suspected Tamil militants -- dampened New Delhi's interest in the internal matters of Sri Lanka and furthermore limited the scope of their cooperation.

WPR: What is the current status of bilateral relations, including priorities, opportunities and challenges?

Kuusisto: Since the 1980s, the India-Sri Lanka relationship has gradually improved, driven by the 1998 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries. The agreement brought a rapid expansion in India-Sri Lanka trade, which totaled $2.02 billion in 2009, and particularly benefitted the Sri Lankan economy. Prior to the agreement, India was a key source of Sri Lanka's imports, accounting for 8.5 percent of total imports in 1999, but only fourteenth on the list of export destinations. India is now fourth in the list of export destinations (behind the U.S., U.K. and Italy), accounting for 5 percent of all Sri Lankan exports. India is also now the fourth-largest investor in Sri Lanka (after Singapore, the U.K., and Australia). India and Sri Lanka are in the process of negotiating a new, more extensive Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which will abolish the remaining non-tariff barriers.

WPR: How does this relationship fit into the larger context of India-China rivalry?

Kuusisto: Indian threat perceptions have grown as China has become more active in South Asia. Sri Lanka is no exception. Chinese investment has expanded rapidly, including the strategically situated commercial deep-sea port in Hambantota -- which is President Mahinda Rajapakse's home constituency -- and the two-phase coal power plant in Norochcholai. During the civil war in Sri Lanka, Beijing provided unconditional diplomatic, economic and military support to the Sri Lankan government, winning significant goodwill in Colombo. And China is now offering to provide financing and technical expertise to the Sri Lankan government, which is pursuing an aggressive, multi-million dollar reconstruction program. New Delhi sees this Chinese maneuvering as an incursion into its historic sphere of influence, and is consequently trying to outbid the Chinese for strategically important infrastructure projects.

Obama So Far: Iran, Russia and China

Posted By Judah Grunstein 27 Jul 2010 There have been a couple of "confirmed" inflection points in the Obama administration's approach to Iran, Russia and China in the past few weeks, and the contrast between the outcomes is revealing, both about the relative challenges of the three portfolios, but also about the relative development of the three countries.

With regard to Iran, although there are not yet any concrete outcomes, the Obama administration's strategy of open-ended engagement accompanied by staged sanctions has clearly isolated Tehran, to an extent that many critics of the Obama approach -- myself included -- did not anticipate. In the past week, Iran has reiterated its desire to continue fuel swap negotiations with the Vienna Group, and has essentially accepted EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton's invitation to direct talks, at the same time that the EU was announcing a new round of stiff unilateral sanctions. Meanwhile, Iran finds relations with Russia increasingly chilly, with Moscow formally rebuking President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his recent criticism of Russian support for U.N. sanctions, calling his remarks unacceptable" and "irresponsible."

The shift in Russia's approach reflects a qualitiative reassessment by Moscow of the goals of Iran's nuclear program, which John McCreary discusses here . As he notes, it's impossible to know what information was shared behind closed doors. But in the context of broader bilateral relations, the Obama reset seems to have had a convincing effect in terms of Russia's short-term calculus of the cost-benefit analysis of cooperation with the U.S. As I've argued before, the benefits of cooperation, with the U.S. and Europe, remain structurally driven for Russia. And the mid-term calculus still presents many possibilities for divergence , especially since Iran is an important commercial partner for Russia. But the space offered by the reset has certainly reduced the short-term costs of cooperation.

Finally, with regard to China, the results are more mixed and much more volatile. There seems to be a cyclical variation between cooperation and tension that is in part determined by the political and diplomatic calendar (Taiwan arms sales, currency depreciation). But this Taiwan News editorial about the choices facing Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou in the recent South China Sea back-and-forth is also a revealing indicator of the U.S. strategic calculus as well. Essentially, China is in the process of defining its version of the Monroe Doctrine, both geographically and symbollically. So far, the U.S. has formulated its response on a case-by-case basis, based on a pragmatic flexibility that reflects the complexities of being a global hegemon addressing regional strategic shifts. But as always, the risk of pragmatism and flexibility is that they very closely resemble incoherence and weakness, both at home and abroad.

So far, the Obama approach on three of the five hot portfolios it faced upon taking office (the Middle East writ large and North Korea being the other two) has run the gamut from well-conceived and successful (Russia) to uninspired but successful (Iran) to necessary but unconvincing (China). That has been a function of the range of options available, but also the respective stages of development of the three countries involved. Past its prime and with a rusting industrial capacity, Russia is most receptive to a thaw. Not yet ready for prime time and facing an abrupt shift in regional dynamics following the unforced errors of the Bush administration, Iran is most vulnerable to a freeze. And reaching the limits of its economic rise if not its ambitions, China is most sensitive to perceived constraints.

Global Insider: The Turkey-Greece Airspace Dispute

Posted By Kari Lipschutz 26 Jul 2010 Last week, Greek forces intercepted Turkish fighter jets while on training flights over the Aegean Sea. In an e-mail interview, Dr. Petros Vamvakas , assistant professor of Political Science at Emmanuel College, explains the context for the airspace dispute between Turkey and Greece.

WPR: What is the nature of the airspace dispute between the two countries?

Petros Vamvakas: The airspace dispute is one component of a more complex quarrel between neighbors. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) favors Greece, an archipelagic state, since extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would effectively result in 90 percent of the Aegean being defined as Greek territorial waters, along with the corresponding airspace. Due to its relative strength and lack of islands, Turkey favors a political solution, even if this position challenges prevailing international law. In 1995, the Turkish parliament declared that an extension by Greece of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles from the current six would be considered an act of war -- "casus belli" -- even though Turkey has extended its territorial waters outside the Aegean to 12 nautical miles. Furthermore, even though Turkey recognizes Greece's Flight Information Region (FIR) jurisdiction over civilian flights, it refuses to acknowledge Greek authority over military flights, as is the norm in similar situations. Instead, Turkey consistently refuses to submit military flight plans to Athens in an attempt to avoid the de facto implementation of international law, a refusal that Greece considers a violation of airspace.

WPR: Have there been any meaningful attempts to resolve it?

Vamvakas: There have been several attempts to solve the Aegean dispute, as the issue has become increasingly complicated, and Greece and Turkey have reached the brink of conflict on several occasions. The first two attempts at resolution followed episodes that brought the two neighbors to the brink of an open conflict in 1987 and 1996, while the third and more meaningful attempt came within the framework of Turkey's application for accession to the European Union. As part of the 1999 EU Helsinki summit agreement, Turkey agreed to solve all bilateral disputes with Greece in order to begin membership negotiations with the EU. However, changes in administration in Turkey in 2002 and in Greece in 2004 led to a new impasse, as the EU-Turkey relationship became increasingly troubled.

WPR: To what extent does it represent a real risk for conflict?

Vamvakas: The possibilities for conflict are very real for a variety of political, military and economic reasons. As long as Turkey maintains its de facto challenges to Greece's airspace jurisdiction -- by proclaiming "grey zones" of sovereignty over a number of islands -- and to Athens' FIR over military flights, while also continuing its casus belli posturing, the risk of conflict is real. But even though the risk of conflict is very real, the possibility of conflict remains distant, since interest groups within each country are either committed to ending this dispute, or else would like to limit it to remaining a low-intensity conflict in order to promote a domestic political agenda. It is overwhelmingly understood on both sides of the Aegean that a hot conflict would be suicidal.

COIN After Afghanistan

Posted By Judah Grunstein 23 Jul 2010 A flurry of posts on COIN happen to form a coherent discussion of the strengths, weaknesses and future of counterinsurgency in the post-Afghanistan era: Michael Cohen here , David Ucko here, Spencer Ackerman (responding to Cohen) here and Andrew Exum responding to Ucko here . This last one by David Steven , unrelated to the rest, neatly wraps some context around them all.

As for me, I think the U.S. military will leave Afghanistan having integrated the full-spectrum, whole-of-government approach to warfare, that it will not reapply its newly gained expertise in any major conflict for the decade that Stevens floats, but that it will possess a virtual monopoly on the practical skill sets that will drive military-to-military training missions designed to stabilize conflict zones for that same period of time. In other words, COIN -- and with it, the U.S. military -- will remain practically relevant as the glue that binds America's strategic relationships with weak states and lesser regional powers.

Global Helicopter Crisis

Posted By Judah Grunstein 23 Jul 2010 Pretty hard to fathom how, years after it became widely apparent that we're facing a global shortage of helicopters, we still read stories like this one . Obviously, the transfer of two Swedish helicopters from anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden to an EU defense standby brigade isn't going to have a huge impact on global security. But this is one reason why Russia is looking like an attractive partner for both EU defense and NATO missions. (The other being that both Iraq and Afghanistan operate mainly Soviet-era helicopter fleets.) You'd think we'd have at least seen some sort of effort to address the problem.

Connecting States vs. Dividing States

Posted By Judah Grunstein 23 Jul 2010 Although Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez are often lumped together in the same Latin American "populist left" basket, the fact that Correa is involved in mediating the latest manufactured crisis between Venezuela and Colombia underscores the difference between the two.

It also suggests that power in the emerging geopolitical landscape will increasingly relocate toward the connecting states that manage to bridge differences between various feuding nodes. Clearly, Turkey is the most visible example of how that will work, but Qatar is another. And a detail from this NY Times article on the impact of sanctions on Iran's efforts to develop its South Pars gas field jumped out at me in this regard:

Qatar, the Arab emirate that shares the gas field with Iran, exported $62 billion of mainly gas products in 2008, while Iran's gas exports brought in about $6 billion. But Iran's potential profits are huge, project managers said. They estimate that Iran could earn up to $130 billion a year from natural gas . . .

That's a pretty stark numeric reflection of the cost-benefit differential between connecting states and divider states. In an age of persistent conflict, the demand for conflict resolution will obviously rise. Which means the peacemakers will not only be blessed, but richer and more powerful, too.

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